Weizmann vs Ben-Gurion: Battle of the Statesmen

Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion were both invaluable to political Zionism and ultimately to the creation of a Jewish state with the founding of Israel in 1948. Chaim Weizmann served as President of the World Zionist Organization from 1920 to 1931 and also from 1935 to 1946 while David Ben-Gurion was the Chairman of the executive committee of the Jewish Agency from 1935 until 1948. Both these illustrious figures were vital in the creation of Israel and it can be strongly argued that the Jewish State may never have come to fruition without these two prolific figures. Despite sharing the same common goal, their relationship deteriorated over the years and resulted in arguments, resentment of one another and a political power struggle that would ultimately crown Ben-Gurion as victor. In this essay, I will analyse the divisions between these two figures, using both primary and secondary sources, as well as conclude to what extent these divisions typified Zionism between the 1930s and 1940s.

Weizmann and Ben-Gurion had minor clashes throughout the early 1930s but these did not fully come into fruition until the late 30’s and primarily the 40’s. At the 20th Zionist Congress held in 1937 Weizmann praised Moshe Sharett, head of the political section of the Jewish Agency, in his address during a session closing the congress while completely omitting any mention of Ben-Gurion. In response to this, Ben-Gurion stated that he viewed Weizmann as “an important instrument for our enterprise - and the enterprise, and only the enterprise, interests me.” This quote demonstrates how Ben-Gurion personally saw Weizmann. He may well have personally disagreed with Weizmann, his methods and his character but understood that he was invaluable to the Zionist cause. 

One of the main divisions between the two figures was how they viewed Zionism’s relationship with Britain and America. Weizmann was very much wedded to Britain and held the view that American and British cooperation would help Zionism, whereas Ben-Gurion saw that the Zionists should shift their main focus to America, but without forgetting Britain, as after the war America would emerge as the dominant power. Ben-Gurion thought that after the war America could pressure Britain into accepting Zionist demands. For Weizmann, his relationship with the British both greatly benefited and hampered his political efforts within Zionism. Weizmann held the advantage within Zionist circles that as long as the Zionists had a healthy relationship with Britain, he would be the sole negotiator for the Zionist cause. No one else within the Zionist party possessed the contacts and influence that he held within Whitehall as well as his diplomatic eloquence. However, this essentially meant that his career within Zionism rested on cooperation between Zionism and Britain which meant that he had to tread carefully at times. Weizmann stated that it was difficult for him to use force in America because “as a British subject I have to be exceedingly careful not to contribute to the strain in Anglo-American relations.” He specifically stated it was a pressure he felt that Ben-Gurion didn’t and went on to say, “I find myself, especially on foreign soil, in an extremely delicate position. I must be doubly careful not to do anything which might possibly make Mr Churchill’s task more difficult. This naturally places a limitation on my public utterances.” On the other hand, Ben-Gurion was not wedded to either Britain or America so could be more audacious in his dealings. 

Ben-Gurion, as well as many in the Yishuv, held Weizmann personally responsible for the British issuing the White Paper in 1939 as well as the failure to lobby the British to establish a Jewish fighting force. Ben-Gurion was a man of action and believed that to achieve a state the Zionists needed to have an army and often even wanted to fight against the British. He wanted Zionism to become a ‘fighting Zionism’ as opposed to Weizmanns ‘talking Zionism’, however, the majority of his colleagues would disagree profoundly with his notion of fighting Britain during the war, especially a war against the Nazis. In England, although Churchill was in support of a Jewish Army in Palestine, the War, Colonial and Foreign offices were all opposed to it for many reasons, such as Arab repercussions as well as the threat from the Zionists themselves after the war if they were to have a trained fighting force. If the Zionists had an army, the British knew that they could use this as a political advantage in their effort to gain a state after the war. Ultimately, Weizmann was not able to successfully negotiate a Jewish division until, after 5 years, at the end of 1944, thanks to Winston Churchill, a Jewish brigade was formed under its own insignia and Star of David flag and saw action in Italy and Germany. Within the negotiations lie further differences between the two figures. For Weizmann, living in Britain, he did not care where a Jewish fighting force saw action, just that one was to exist. For Ben-Gurion, living in Palestine, the Yishuv was the most important thing in his view and a Jewish force had to be for the defence of Palestine, as well as in Europe to fight the Nazis, especially during the times when the Axis advance in the Middle East was seen as an imminent threat to the Jews in Palestine. On September 9 1942, 127 people were killed in Tel Aviv as a result of an Italian attack by air. Ben-Gurion seemed to hold Weizmann personally responsible for this due to his failure to negotiate with the British for a Jewish fighting force, even though the British could not go against the policy of the White Paper published in 1939 no matter how hard Weizmann tried. Ben-Gurion could simply not understand how the failure for so long to establish a fighting force was not solely Weizmann's fault. 

Another rift between the two figures was Ben-Gurion not trusting Weizmann to be alone. Although Ben-Gurion saw Weizmann as a ‘threat to Zionism’, he knew that he was essential to the Zionist cause and saw it best to rather oversee Weizmann’s work to ensure he was adhering to the same policy that he and the Jewish Agency Executive had. This can be seen in 1936 when Ben-Gurion decided to extend his stay in London so that he could continue to oversee Weizmann. This extension of Ben-Gurion's stay was due to more differences between the two. Weizmann was contemplating the idea of offering to suspend Jewish immigration to Palestine to win over favour with the British, this was at the other end of the spectrum to Ben-Gurion's more fanciful idea’s of Palestine taking in millions of Jewish immigrants. This incident started to cause a rift in the Zionist party. Weizmann wanted a suspension of Jewish immigration to Palestine but this was something that Ben-Gurion and the Yishuv could not even fathom let alone accept. Weizmann had allegedly told Nuri Pasha, the Iraqi foreign minister, of his plans to offer a year's suspension of Jewish immigration. Ben-Gurion was so scared that Weizmann would destroy Zionism with his offer of suspending Jewish immigration that he not only asked Moshe Sharrett to come to London to help watch over Weizmann but also cancelled a trip to Warsaw to stay and watch Weizmann himself. Unfortunately, in June of 1936, word started to spread around Whitehall that Weizmann had agreed to suspend Jewish immigration at the request of Nuri Pasha. Weizmann would deny this and this led Ben-Gurion to demand that he write a letter to Ormsby-Gore in the Foreign Office as well as the British ambassador in Baghdad and that he would help him with this endeavour. After this, Ben-Gurion convinced Weizmann to compose yet another letter to cement the Zionist position, once more to Ormsby-Gore in the Foreign Office. Ben-Gurion wrote one in Hebrew with an English version composed by Professor Namier and Rabbi Stephen Wise, with Weizmann merely signing the documents. For a public figure of Weizmann’s character, this along with the ever-present watchful eye of Ben-Gurion would have been demeaning and insulting to him. Ben-Gurion also started to hold contempt for Weizmann and question his judgement, thus causing a further rift between them. The Nuri Pasha incident stained Weizmann’s image in the eyes of Ben-Gurion. 

In America, the differences between the two would come to a boiling point and erupt. Weizmann and Ben-Gurion both disagreed on the inner workings and procedures within Zionism. Ben-Gurion wanted the Jewish Agency Executive, of which he was Chairman, to head Zionist policy-making and thus relegate the President of the Zionist Organisation to merely a role of prestige rather than one of power. This would render Weizmann, the president, subordinate to Ben-Gurion. Weizmann saw himself as only subordinate to the Zionist Congress. In 1939, Weizmann created the Emergency Committee in America which was headed by his friends and followers. Ben-Gurion held the view that the Emergency Committee had no authority to negotiate with anyone without the consent of the Agency Executive, ultimately himself. Furthermore, in 1942, Weizmann proposed the creation of a political bureau in America which would be led by his Emergency Committee. Ben-Gurion supported the creation of this but insisted that it had to be subordinate to the Agency Executive with a Palestinian leader and not the Emergency Committee. This is a central theme to the differences arising between the two in America. The two seemed to disagree on the inner workings and legal procedures within the Zionist Organisation as well as how much power the two figures actually held and what they could do with those powers.Ben-Gurion was engaged in a power struggle to gain equal footing in terms of power with Weizmann, while Weizmann was trying to escape Ben-Gurion’s reach. 

In the American arena, the focus of the Zionists was to use the Jewish population to influence and pressure the government there. In 1942 the differences between the two exploded with Ben-Gurion accusing Weizmann of not including him in his political activities in America as well as acting alone and not achieving the aims vital to the cause. Weizmann dismissed these allegations and responded to the allegations of acting alone and leaving Ben-Gurion out by saying “If you, for reasons I am unable to comprehend, chose to absent yourself from some or most of these consultations, the fault is surely not mine. I am tempted to say that if any guilt attaches at all in that direction, it is rather with the accuser than with the accused.” Two days after this response to Ben-Gurion, Weizmann responds to another letter from him letting him know that it is pointless to continue their conversation. After this debacle, Stephen Wise, Chairman of the Emergency Committee set up by Weizmann, was approached by Ben-Gurion and asked to convene a meeting to help fix the conflict between the two Zionist leaders. Ben-Gurion threatened that if after this, Weizmann did not change his ways he would lobby the Agency Executive to demand Weizman be deposed. On June 27th 1942, Wise held an informal meeting in his home with Weizmann and Ben-Gurion along with seven other Zionist figures present. During the meeting, both Weizmann and Ben-Gurion argued and insulted each other with Ben-Gurion going off on a tirade against Weizmann. He reiterated that he didn't have faith in Weizmann to act alone and that if he didn’t change his ways he should resign as president. Ultimately this meeting only provided Weizmann with more sympathy from all those present due to the harshness of Ben-Gurion's attack on him. Shortly after this, In a letter to Berl Locker, Weizmann expressed his anger at the situation and that he would resign “if it were not for the critical situation.” In the month of July 1942, Weizmann composed multiple letters complaining about Ben-Gurion as well as expressing the strain that this along with his work is causing him.  When Ben-Gurion returned to Palestine at the end of 1942, the Agency Executive invited Weizmann but he rejected this invitation due to poor health, something he was facing increasingly more with older age. Weizmann launched an attack on Ben-Gurion in his rejection of the invitation, referring to him as a ‘petty dictator’, among other names. 

Yet again, in 1942, both figures seemed to be working against each other rather than in the best interest of the Zionist cause. Ben-Gurion and Weizmann both wanted desperately to meet with President Roosevelt and tried to access him through many contacts. John Gilbert Winant was the ambassador to the United Kingdom at that time and both figures tried to reach Roosevelt through him. In April of 1942, Winant had requested that Weizmann relay a message to Ben-Gurion saying that he apologised for not setting up a meeting between him and Roosevelt and that he was now able to do so. Weizmann, allegedly, forgot to relay this message to Ben-Gurion for over a month by which time the meeting could no longer be arranged. Ultimately, it was Weizmann who managed to meet with Roosevelt, in July of that year, and not Ben-Gurion. Prior to leaving America in 1942, Ben-Gurion convened the Emergency Committee to express contempt of Weizmann’s school of thought of slow and gradual Jewish immigration to Palestine and instead pushed forward his policy of admitting millions in a single operation. This demonstrates just how different the two most powerful people within Zionism viewed the dire situation unfolding in front of them. In America, the relationship between Weizman and Ben-Gurion was decimated and dragged other members of the Zionist enterprise into the mix through meetings such as the one organised by Stephen Wise.

In conclusion, the relationship between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion was plagued with divisions and conflicts. On one hand, you had Ben-Gurion who was wrestling for equal power to Weizmann from within the Agency Executive and trying to steer Zionism away from Britain and into America and on the other you had Weizmann who was wedded to Britain and felt demoralised and demeaned by Ben-Gurion's constant watch and distrust of him. Both figures had the same goal yet very different ideas of how to reach it. The extent to which their divisions typified Zionism can be argued. If they had come together to work cohesively they would have had an unstoppable force at the disposal of Zionism and could have potentially achieved their aims quicker and more effectively rather than waste time engaging in conflict and argument. However, ultimately they did achieve the aim of the creation of a Jewish state in 1948. I would say that to some extent Zionism can be typified by the intra-divisions between the two central figures as it cannot be ignored. Much of Ben-Gurion's time was spent watching over Weizmann when he could have been using this time much more effectively and he also spent years threatening to depose Weizmann, while threatening to resign himself, and battling against him politically instead of working with him peacefully. The intra-divisions between the two figures demonstrate broader debates about the different schools of thought within Zionism on how best to achieve a Jewish state at the time, whether it be primarily through America, Britain, both, or even conflict with the British. Both figures knew they needed each other, yet they couldn't settle their differences over the course of a decade and these divisions only deepened and dragged others within Zionism into them to try and pacify the conflict. Eventually, Weizmann would effectively be dismissed as president in 1946 and Ben-Gurion would become the leader of Zionism and the first prime minister of Israel.

Sources:

Ben-Gurion, David, Letters to Paula and the Children (Hebrew), (Tel Aviv, 1968)

Teveth, Shabtai, Ben-Gurion (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987)

Weizmann Archives (https://www.weizmann-archives.org.il/)

Cohen, Michael J., Palestine: Retreat From the Mandate (New York, Holmes and Meier Publishers Incorporated, 1978)

Zweig, Ronald W., David Ben-Gurion: Politics and Leadership in Israel (London, Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1991)

Bauer, Yehuda, From Diplomacy to Resistance (Philadelphia, The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1970)