The Human Factor: Palestinian Rejectionism and the Failure of the Camp David Process

Introduction

The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is one of the most abiding and emotive geopolitical issues

of contemporary history. The Camp David Process (2000-2001) was one of the most

significant events in the decades-long peace process that still endures today. The Camp

David Summit, convened by U.S. President Bill Clinton from July 11-25, 2000, aimed to

achieve a permanent status agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians and end

the conflict. Ultimately, the summit failed, contributing to the outbreak of the second

intifada, a Palestinian uprising that resulted in far-reaching violence claiming the lives of

thousands, while peace slipped further away. In a last-ditch effort to save the process,

Clinton presented his parameters on December 23, 2000, but these too proved

unsuccessful. Shortly after, in late January 2001, the Israelis and Palestinians held

bilateral negotiations in Taba, but by then it was too late, with the violence of the second

intifada escalating and the Israeli elections interrupting the talks. The Camp David

Summit, Clinton Parameters and the Taba talks are what I refer to as the Camp David

Process. Due to limited word count, I will be focusing on the summit and parameters as

they were the most significant parts of the process.

This dissertation explores the human factor within the negotiations, focusing on the two

delegations, including the leadership and negotiators, as well as their strategies and

decision-making. The focus on the human factor was inspired by Dror Moreh’s (2021)

documentary, which explores the decades-long peace process through the perspective of

American mediators. While there were several contributing factors to the failure, this

dissertation aims to assess the extent to which Palestinian rejectionism caused the failure

of the Camp David Process. Palestinian rejectionism, generally defined as the behaviour

of rejecting proposals and refusing to engage in making counteroffers, is recognised as

one of the leading causes of the failure of the negotiations. This dissertation will examine

the wider context of Palestinian rejectionism and provide new insights into the internal

divisions within the Palestinian delegation and how they contributed detrimentally to the

negotiations.

Importantly, this dissertation will also analyse the actions of the Israeli delegation during

the negotiations, focusing on Prime Minister Ehud Barak and his erratic approach to the

negotiations at the summit. Additionally, the research will explore the internal divisions

within the Israeli delegation, analysing how these divisions affected the progress of

negotiations. The research highlights the productive role of internal Israeli divisions, which

is largely unexplored in the existing literature.

By analysing Palestinian rejectionism, Israeli leadership decisions, and internal divisions

on both sides, this dissertation provides a nuanced explanation of the failure of the Camp

David Process while highlighting the human factor. As the Israeli/Palestinian conflict

persists to this day, it is vital to understand past failures. Understanding past failures

facilitates the evolution of diplomatic strategies in future negotiations. Therefore, my

research concludes with recommendations for future negotiations, informed by my

findings. Additionally, the research in this dissertation also contributes to a gap in the

knowledge, as there is little academic material analysing the internal divisions within the

Israeli and Palestinian delegations. By addressing this gap, this dissertation further

emphasises the importance of the human factor in emotive and high-stakes negotiations

while offering a unique contribution to the literature.

Literature review

The literature on the topic presents a clear Rashomon effect, with varying and often

contradictory interpretations behind the failure of the Camp David Process. The main

works that have been most useful to my research are: Charles Enderlin’s book ‘Shattered

Dreams’ (2003); Jeremy Pressman’s article ‘Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp

David and Taba?’ (2003); Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman’s ‘The Camp David

Summit - What Went Wrong?’ (2005) and Tamara Cofman Wittes’s ‘How Israelis and

Palestinians negotiate: A cross-cultural analysis of the Oslo Peace Process’ (2005).

These works can be split into two categories. The first consists of those that focus solely

on the Camp David Process, such as Pressman’s (2003) article and Shimon Shamir and

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman’s (2005) book. The second includes works that situate the Camp

David Process into the wider context of the Arab/Israeli and Israeli/Palestinian peace

talks, such as Wittes’s (2005) book, as well as works by Meital (2005) and Podeh (2015).

Enderlin’s (2003) book fits between the two categories, as while it spans across a seven-

year period, beginning with the death of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, its

main focus is the Camp David Process.

The division suggests that some scholars consider the Camp David Process to merely be

an event within the wider Arab/Israeli and Israeli/Palestinian peace talks, whereas others

consider it to be a significant moment in the history of the peace process. The works

explore a range of themes, including Palestinian rejectionism, Israeli and Palestinian

negotiating strategies, the role of the mediator and the core issues of the negotiations. I

shall address some of these below.

Theme 1 - Palestinian rejectionism

The Orthodox narrative for the failure of the Camp David Process is that the Israelis made

a generous offer at the summit, which was rejected by the Palestinians, who also later

rejected the Clinton Parameters. Itamar Rabinovich (2005) refers to this as the ‘Israeli/

American orthodoxy’, which has become the mainstream narrative. Much of the literature

surrounding the Camp David Process can be seen as either challenging or reaffirming this

narrative, with scholars attempting to determine what truly happened during the

negotiations.

Pressman’s (2003) article challenges the orthodox narrative, arguing that the Palestinian

narrative is the most accurate. While he acknowledges that Barak went further than any

Israeli Prime Minister in making concessions, he rejects the notion that a ‘generous offer’

was presented, viewing it instead as an incomplete offer from the Palestinian perspective.

He notes that the Palestinians made concessions, in contradiction to their adherence to

principle. However, he criticises the Palestinians for failing to recognise the concessions

agreed to by Israel, and for their failure to curtail terrorism during the second intifada.

Pressman downplays Palestinian rejectionism and offers a revisionist account of the

Clinton Parameters, which has been challenged by scholars such as Elie Podeh (2005),

whose arguments I will elaborate on later in this work.

Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman’s (2005) edited volume ‘The Camp David

Summit - What Went Wrong?’ offers a comparative account of the Camp David Process.

The book includes primary accounts from the Israeli negotiators and American mediators,

Palestinian perspectives, and academic and expert commentary. The book is a

comprehensive study of the Camp David Process, focusing particularly on the summit,

deeply enriching the literature. As it features over 20 contributors, no single narrative

dominates. The diversity of accounts reflects a wide array of issues and themes, allowing

for an in-depth exploration. Nevertheless, the theme of Palestinian rejectionism can be

identified throughout the many contributors. Overall, the book highlights the dominance

of the Israeli/American orthodox narrative and the overlooked Palestinian narrative.

Theme 2 - Cultural/Interpersonal

The cultural and interpersonal aspects of the negotiations are often emphasised

throughout the literature. This theme is analysed in-depth in Tamara Cofman Wittes’s

(2005) edited volume by both Israeli and Palestinian academics. Aharon Klieman (2005)

discusses the influential Israeli security-oriented negotiating subculture and how it was

challenged by the diplomatic counter-subculture during the peace talks. He explores the

influence of the security establishment within Israeli society and how the militaristic

attitude, embodied by Barak, was often received negatively by the Palestinians, especially

during negotiations when trust was crucial. I will expand upon this in my analysis,

demonstrating how Barak's behaviour, forged by his extensive military career, pushed the

Palestinians away and hindered the progress of the talks.

Throughout most of the literature surrounding the Camp David Process, the interpersonal

aspect is often referenced. While the negative relationship that existed between the two

leaders, Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat, is widely recognised, there is disagreement about

what extent it contributed to the failure of the negotiations. Academics such as Pundik

(2005), Klieman (2005) and Dajani (2005) argue that cultural and interpersonal factors

contributed to the failure of the talks, whereas figures such as Yuval Steinitz (2005)

disagree, claiming that it is wrong to place such importance on these factors.

Dajani (2005) and Klieman (2005), as well as others throughout the literature (Shamir and

Maddy-Weitzman, 2005), emphasise the importance and sensitivity both Israelis and

Palestinians place on their narratives and histories. For the Palestinians, sensitive issues

such as the Nakba, occupation and refugees are painful to negotiate. Similarly, for the

Israelis, the Jewish connection to Jerusalem and the Temple Mount holds fundamental

importance.

Theme 3 - Core issues & roadblocks

Throughout the literature, the core issues are identified as borders, Jerusalem, refugees

and security. There is a common consensus that Jerusalem and refugees were the most

contentious issues. Roadblocks to peace outside of the negotiations are also mentioned,

namely Palestinian terrorism and Israeli settlement expansion (Enderlin, 2003; Meital,

2005; Pressman, 2003; Shamir and Maddy-Weitzman, 2005; Wittes, 2005).

The literature points to Barak being under pressure to make concessions to advance the

negotiations while simultaneously not wanting to be seen as acquiescing to terrorism

(Meital, 2005; Podeh, 2015). Whereas Arafat felt he couldn’t rein in the militants as he

needed to keep his image, which was built upon struggle and resistance (Meital, 2005;

Podeh, 2015; Pressman, 2003).

The continuation of settlement construction also disillusioned the Palestinians, who felt

that Israel was not negotiating in good faith. (Enderlin, 2003; Arieli, 2005; Quandt, 2005).

This demonstrates that external factors had a direct impact on negotiations.

Gaps in the knowledge

My research has identified a gap in the knowledge concerning the internal divisions within

the Israeli and Palestinian delegations. While the internal divisions are briefly mentioned,

they are only addressed with very limited detail (Balaban, 2005; Enderlin, 2003; Shamir

and Maddy-Weitzman, 2005). My research has found that Omar Dajani (2005) is the only

academic to have discussed internal divisions within either the Israeli or Palestinian

delegations in any detail, focusing on the internal Palestinian divisions. A large part of this

dissertation contributes to filling this gap in the existing literature. In my research

concerning Palestinian internal divisions, Dajani’s work was a vital contribution alongside

other secondary sources and primary sources.

Methodologies used

The vast majority of literature does not explicitly state the methodology employed. A likely

explanation is that a large amount of it has been produced for the popular market, which

is generally not interested in the technicalities of methodology.

Enderlin’s (2003) qualitative methodology relies primarily on his interviews with

negotiators at the time, providing a unique perspective as opposed to the common

retrospective analysis. In contrast, Dajani (2005), who was directly involved with the

negotiations, offers a firsthand perspective. While this raises questions of potential bias,

Dajani is one of the few Palestinians with firsthand experience to contribute academically,

making his contributions especially valuable. Additionally, Meital (2005) and Pressman

(2003) use the historical method by critically analysing primary sources, while also

engaging with secondary sources, to understand the Camp David Process.

A limitation of the literature is its proximity to the Camp David Process, with many works

published within five years of the event. Consequently, primary sources are often heavily

relied upon without sufficient support from secondary sources. This can lead to omissions

due to insufficient sources or knowledge at the time. I had the advantage of conducting

my research over two decades after the Camp David Process, providing me with a wider

array of literature to interact with and greater historical distance, enabling a more

comprehensive engagement.

Methodology

The research in this dissertation has been conducted through qualitative methodologies. I

am interested in the individuals involved in the peace talks and the emotions they carried,

individuals burdened with the future of entire nations. I focus on the decisions made and

strategies used during negotiations and the potential reasons behind these. The human

factor is paramount in Israeli/Palestinian peace talks, from the mediators and advisors to

the leaders themselves, every step along the way reflects the decisions of individuals,

shaped by their motives and emotions.

I will use the diplomatic historical method informed by international relations, as outlined

by Trachtenberg (2006), to assess the extent to which Palestinian rejectionism caused the

failure of the Camp David Process. The diplomatic method is suited to my research as it

focuses on the primary accounts of the figures directly involved in the process. A large

amount of the literature on the topic of the Camp David Process has been produced by

those diplomatic figures directly involved. This will allow for a textual analysis of the

decisions, positions and perspectives of the figures directly involved in the negotiations.

The primary sources used for this project are chiefly memoirs, which often draw on

letters, official resolutions, memoranda of understanding and materials that will later enter

diplomatic archival holdings. The diplomatic historical method used will be informed by

international relations due to a large amount of the secondary literature being written by

scholars of international relations.

As I am using qualitative research methods, it is important to reflect on myself, particularly

my own potential biases and personal connections that could affect my research. As

Michael Quinn Patton (2015, p70) states, “To excel in qualitative enquiry requires keen

and astute self-awareness”. The topic of this dissertation is very personal to me. As a

Jew, Israel holds personal meaning to me. Additionally, at the time of writing, I am

currently serving as the Vice President of the University of Manchester’s Friends of Israel

Society. These are factors that need to be acknowledged before presenting my findings.

These are also factors that I have addressed before and during my research.

It is impossible for me to entirely escape my biases and connections. Aaron Miller (The

Human Factor, 2021), an American advisor involved in the Camp David negotiations,

asserts that, “I don’t think I, or anyone frankly, who’s ever worked on this process is free

from the prejudgments and prejudices and biases. You are the sum total of your

experiences”. I, too, am the sum total of my experiences. Subsequently, throughout my

research and writing, I have engaged in a reflexive approach to minimise the effect my

personal judgments have on my findings so that they are as close to an objective truth as

possible. During my research, I engaged in note-taking to ensure that my personal

judgments were filtered out and did not influence my writing. As an acknowledgement of

this, I will also not be using the traditional academic voice of passivity; I will be using a

personal voice, writing in the first person. As a human being, I am “the instrument of

qualitative methods” (Patton, 2015, 72).

Chapter 1: The State of Israel

In this chapter, I focus on the Israeli delegation during the peace talks. Following the

diplomatic historical method informed by international relations outlined in my

methodology, I draw on both primary and secondary sources to identify decisions and

aspects of Israeli behaviour that either contributed to the progress or detriment of the

negotiations. The main focus is Ehud Barak and his negotiating team. I critically analyse

the behaviour of Barak, arguing that it contributed detrimentally to the peace talks, while

also acknowledging that ultimately he did abandon his hardline positions and accept

many concessions. I will then address the relationship between Barak and his negotiators,

contending that internal divisions existed between them, which had a constructive effect

on the negotiations.

Ehud Barak

Ehud Barak assumed office in 1999, positioning himself as the prime minister who would

resolve the Israeli/Palestinian conflict (Meital, 2005, 53-55). However, his approach

aggravated the Palestinians from the outset. His election victory speech upset them by

solidifying Israeli negotiating principles perceived as hostile to Palestinian interests, such

as a unified Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty and no return to the 1967 borders

(Enderlin, 2003, 112; Lipkin-Shahak, 2005, 42-43). Additionally, Barak prioritised a peace

deal with Syria, despite warnings from Israeli intelligence chiefs of the potentially lethal

consequences of sidelining the Palestinians (Enderlin, 2003, 137). American negotiator

Aaron Miller (2005, 94) states that this decision “seriously minimized the prospects that

Camp David would succeed in introducing a breakthrough”. Additionally, Elie Podeh

(2015, 277), an Israeli author and academic who has written about the peace process,

observes that it aroused suspicions with the Palestinians, who felt that he was trying to

“undermine their position by isolating them in the Arab world”. Israeli Ambassador Martin

Indyk (2009, 295) states that as Barak was willing to offer Syrian President Asad full

withdrawal based upon the 1967 borders, “Arafat now had to get the same kind of deal”

(Indyk, 2009, 295), something Barak was not prepared to do. Whereas, Barak (2005, 129)

argues that it would have been irresponsible not to pursue a deal with Syria as long as the

opportunity existed, contending that he reassured Arafat that it would not come at the

expense of the Palestinians. However, Miller (2008, 284) recalls that Arafat responded

negatively to the announcement of formal Israeli-Syrian talks in Washington, warning that

Barak should not take him for granted. Podeh (2015, 277) adds that Barak failed to

alleviate Palestinian fears, similarly suggesting that Barak’s decision to focus first on a

deal with Syria contributed detrimentally to the Camp David Process.

Barak’s decision to withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon further angered the Palestinians,

as many saw the withdrawal due to the armed resistance of Hezbollah. This reinforced the

belief that violence rather than diplomacy yielded results (Podeh, 2015, 279; Quandt,

2005, 32; Dajani, 2005, 55). Barak (2005, 129) justified the withdrawal by stating Israel

had no territorial claim over Lebanese soil and that he did not want to see more Israeli

soldiers dying in the conflict. However, the perception of the withdrawal as a concession

to violence and terrorism would stay with the Palestinians during negotiations (Indyk,

2009, 296; Qurei, 2008, 129; Ginossar, 2005, 53).

Baraks military influence

Before entering politics, Barak served in the IDF for 35 years, ending his military career as

the Commander-in-Chief. Meital (2005, 54) notes that although Israeli society often views

former military leaders as possessing the “necessary talents and mettle for political

leadership”, they are not necessarily knowledgeable of all the factors and influences at

the political level. Barak represented the security subculture that heavily influences Israeli

negotiating strategy, whereas senior figures within his delegation, such as Minister of

Internal Security Shlomo Ben-Ami, represented the diplomatic subculture (Klieman, 2005,

87, 96). This clash of differences will be addressed in the following subchapter.

Barak’s erratic and isolationist behaviour (Enderlin, 2003, 178, 214, 241; The Human

Factor, 2021) reflects the “undiplomatic bluntness” (Klieman, 2005, 94) of Israeli generals,

which is symptomatic of the wider security subculture. Aharon Klieman (2005, 94-95), an

Israeli international relations scholar, argues that this assertiveness can convey “a sense

of overbearing arrogance and superiority” during negotiations. Ahron Bregman (2015,

201), an Israeli author and scholar of the Arab-Israeli conflict, similarly labels Barak as

“arrogant, unpleasant and dismissive”, reinforcing the notion that Barak’s behaviour was

incompatible with diplomatic negotiations. Senior Palestinian negotiator Ahmed Qurie

(Beilin, 2004, 126) warned the Israelis that “Barak exudes contempt and arrogance, and

to be sure, attitude plays an important part in negotiations”. Seemingly, Arafat in

particular appeared to possess a need to feel respected and not taken for granted (The

Human Factor, 2021; Miller, 2008, 62-63). American negotiators Dennis Ross and Martin

Indyk suggest that the interpersonal relationship between Rabin and Arafat played a role

in progressing previous negotiations (The Human Factor, 2021). In contrast, Abdulsalam

Muala (2019, 25) argues that “linking the negotiation deadlock with the lack of trust

between the negotiating parties is unconvincing”, regarding Israeli/Palestinian

negotiations. However, Muala’s (2019) study is not specific to the Camp David Process,

and evidence from the negotiators involved suggests trust was indeed an important

factor, especially for Arafat (Beilin, 2004, 126, 158; Ben-Ami, 2022, 296–197; Miller, 2008,

62–63; The Human Factor, 2021). Wittes’s (2005) cross-cultural analysis of the Oslo Peace

Process further suggests that in such an emotionally charged conflict, cultural factors

such as communication and trust are important.

Barak’s behaviour, influenced by his military mindset and the wider Israeli security

subculture, detrimentally affected the negotiations as he focused solely on the ‘mission’

while disregarding the interpersonal aspects crucial for building trust. Interestingly,

Barak’s attitude and hardline approach stand in stark opposition to the historic

concessions he agreed to make. Ultimately, by the time Barak accepted the Clinton

Parameters, he had reneged on almost all of his opening positions, agreeing to

concessions that struck at the heart of the Israeli national narrative (Indyk, 2009, 322;

Meital, 2005, 56–57; Sher, 2006, 125). He would agree to a divided Jerusalem as well as

the presence of international forces in the Jordan Valley while also agreeing to the

withdrawal from the West Bank almost back to the 1967 armistice lines (Enderlin, 2003,

333-339; Pressman, 2003, 8-9; Sher, 2006, 197-201). The Clinton Parameters will be

discussed in the next chapter.

Klieman (2005, 103) labels this stark contradiction between Barak’s inflexible attitude and

the far-reaching concessions he was willing to make as “perplexing”. He further criticises

Barak’s negotiating strategy as “one of the worst fusions imaginable of the military and

diplomatic subcultures” (Klieman, 2005, 113). Similarly, Indyk (2009, 289-290) notes how

Barak’s militaristic personality informed his negotiating strategy. Podeh (2015, 297) adds

that Barak’s failure in negotiating with Syria caused him to negotiate with the Palestinians

“with the same zeal with which he attacked the enemy during his celebrated military

career”, further emphasising his militaristic personality.

Internal divisions

Here, I contend that internal divisions between Barak and some of his senior negotiators

led to significant concessions and the advancement of the negotiations, in contrast to the

Palestinian delegation, where the internal divisions caused rigidity and hindered progress.

I will discuss how Barak’s senior negotiators, influenced by the diplomatic subculture

discussed above, pushed the boundaries of his mandate and challenged his isolationist

and erratic behaviour. In doing so, I contribute to a gap in the existing literature identified

during my literature review.

From the outset, Barak’s negotiators went beyond what they believed he would accept to

advance the negotiations. The first notable instance occurred in June, during preparation

talks in Washington. Clinton was hesitant about convening a summit, and Dennis Ross,

U.S. envoy to the Middle East, needed to gauge its chances of success. Senior

negotiators Gilead Sher and Shlomo Ben-Ami recommended that Barak take confidence-

boosting measures, such as releasing Palestinian prisoners and committing to the

transfer of certain Jerusalem villages (Sher, 2006, 48). Barak refused, due to the instability

of his coalition. Ben-Ami (2022, 20, 44) is critical of Barak’s frantic rush to a summit,

coupled with his restrictive instructions, which he described as putting a ‘straitjacket’ on

the negotiators.

Nonetheless, Ben-Ami and Sher continued and drafted a paper outlining 16 bridging

ideas between the Israeli and Palestinian positions, which could be used as potential

American bridging ideas. In reality, these ideas hinted at what concessions Israel could be

capable of (Ross, 2004, 634). Barak, unaware of the paper, later asked for it to be

retracted. However, Ben-Ami continued to make progress based on the paper (Ben-Ami,

2022, 45), with Dennis Ross (2004, 636-637) stating that he even went beyond the paper

regarding the sensitive issue of Jerusalem. Ross later pressed Barak to see if he would

uphold these positions discussed by Ben-Ami and Sher. In his typical fashion, Barak did

not give a definitive response but hinted that it might be possible (Ross, 2004, 640). This

initiative, carried out by Israeli negotiators in defiance of Barak’s policy, induced progress

in the negotiations before the summit had even begun. Significantly, it also provided the

Americans with confidence for convening a summit (Ross, 2004, 635).

Further divisions emerged around Jerusalem, one of the core issues. Jerusalem lies at the

heart of the Israeli historical, religious and national narrative. As Israeli diplomat and

Middle East expert Reuven Merhav (2005, 170) states, “Any politician who would have

said so much as ‘we have to rethink the future of Jerusalem,’ would have committed

political suicide”. In line with this sentiment, Barak was uncomfortable even discussing

Jerusalem with the Palestinians before the summit (Ben-Ami, 2022, 39), and only

begrudgingly allowed for ‘discreet discussions’ among his negotiators (Ben-Ami, 2022,

33). Although Barak was willing to go further than any previous Israeli prime minister to

achieve peace with the Palestinians, he remained bound by his red lines, publicly

declaring in his election victory speech that there would be “Once and for all a unified

Jerusalem, under our [Israeli] sovereignty, as the eternal capital of Israel” (Enderlin, 2003,

112).

The topic of concessions on Jerusalem was highly taboo within Israeli society (Beilin,

2004, 164; Bregman, 2015, 237; Indyk, 2009, 299; Klieman, 2000, 139), which the Israeli

negotiators were starkly aware of at Camp David. Sher (2006, 85) would cautiously state,

‘who knew how the public would react to this, what it all meant for our history’ regarding

progress in the negotiations concerning Jerusalem. Yet, during the summit, the Israeli

team had an intense internal discussion about Jerusalem. They acknowledged its

symbolic importance to Palestinians (Enderlin, 2003, 218-220) and the need for flexibility,

while also exploring what Jerusalem meant to them as Jews and Israelis. Israeli minister

Amnon Lipkin-Shahak posed the question, “What is Jerusalem?” (Sher, 2006, 78), and

Barak’s Chief of Staff Danny Yatom similarly noted that the municipal boundaries of

Jerusalem were “not holy, neither from a religious nor from a national perspective” (Sher,

2006, 77). While not everyone agreed (Enderlin, 2003, 221), this episode marked a

significant shift in the mindset of Israeli negotiators as they were generally willing to break

free from the taboos of Jerusalem that had confined negotiations for so long.

Israeli professor of Middle East Studies Yoram Meital, who has written about the Israeli/

Palestinian peace process, describes the internal Israeli deliberations on Jerusalem as

‘sloppiness’, and notes that such deliberations could have been foreseen (Meital, 2005,

79). However, Meital overlooks a crucial point. These internal deliberations prompted a

societal questioning of the motto ‘Jerusalem cannot be divided’, which Barak had echoed

in his victory speech (Enderlin, 2003, 112), and marked a significant shift in Israeli political

discourse. While more preparation may have been beneficial, it was only the high-

pressure environment of the summit that forced this shift to occur. As Sher (2006, 125)

later reflected, “The Israelis had made ten years worth of progress in a week”. As I noted

earlier, in referencing Merhav, it was politically untenable for Barak to openly discuss the

issue of Jerusalem before the summit, and Meital (2005, 79) acknowledges that

Jerusalem was one of the key issues “formerly taboo on Israel’s national agenda”. Thus,

while the Israeli deliberations on Jerusalem were inconveniently timed, they nonetheless

marked a change in how the issue of Jerusalem is approached and signalled an evolution

in Israeli political and negotiation culture surrounding the core issue.

Many Israeli negotiators were concerned by Barak’s behaviour at the summit. During one

episode, in which Barak refused to meet Arafat, Israeli diplomat Yossi Ginossar

challenged him, warning that he was making it hard for the Palestinians as he was always

dictating everything (Sher, 2006, 86). Ginossar also reminded Barak that the majority of

the American mediators were Jewish, reinforcing Palestinian suspicions of collusion (Sher,

2006, 87). Ginossar echoed the Palestinian feeling that they were not equal partners and a

deal was being imposed on them (The Human Factor, 2021).

Shahak and Sher agreed with Ginnosar that Barak should meet Arafat (Sher, 2006, 87).

Ben-Ami further challenged Barak, arguing that with Arafat, not everything was about the

negotiating positions, stating, “he is supposedly a leader of a people, but in fact he is a

person with a deep need for respect, and he feels that you are disrespectful to him. A

large part of his ability to become flexible involves this issue of respect” (Sher, 2006, 87).

Miller (2008, 62-63) and Qurie (Beilin, 2004, 126) both echo Ben-Ami’s claim that Arafat

places great importance on dignity and respect. However, Barak refused to heed the

advice of his negotiators. Ginnosar would again challenge Barak and urged him to change

his attitude toward Arafat. “You are stepping all over him…You can help draw out more

flexibility from them through a less coercive and more open environment,” Ginossar would

exclaim to Barak (Sher, 2006, 94). Continuing to ignore his negotiators, Barak would

refuse to speak with Arafat at an evening gathering, which Sher (2006, 94) describes as

“embarrassing, uncomfortable and unnecessary”. Barak then isolated himself in his cabin

and instructed his negotiators not to contact him (Sher, 2006, 95). After the fact, Ginnosar

(2005, 57) would be highly critical of Barak’s behaviour, stating that it defied “the very

essence of the term ‘summit’”. Many of Barak’s negotiators understood that the

interpersonal dimension was an important aspect of diplomacy and successful

negotiations, whereas Barak (2005, 135) outright rejects this stance. They responsibly

voiced these concerns, however, Barak chose to ignore them (Klieman, 2005, 112-113).

Similarly to Ginossar, Klieman (2005, 113) argues that Barak’s rigid attitude toward Arafat

“runs counter to the essence of the diplomatic culture”. This can be seen through the

frustration of many within Barak’s delegation.

While I contend that the internal divisions within the Israeli delegation were generally

positive, it would be remiss not to mention their downsides. High-stakes peace talks

inevitably generate internal disagreements. Ben-Ami’s flexibility and willingness to go

beyond the official mandate became an issue at points, and the Israeli delegation became

less unified toward the end of the peace talks (Ross, 2004, 749). Israeli Professor of

Philosophy Oded Balaban (Balaban, 2005, 200), who has written on Israeli/Palestinian

negotiations, describes Ben-Ami as being “against Barak’s agenda” during the peace

talks. Similarly, Indyk (2009, 312, 364-65) observed Ben-Ami’s tendency to push Barak’s

mandate, while Beilin (2004, 158) labels him as being part of the “dovish axis” within the

Israeli delegation.

During post-summit negotiations in early December, Ben-Ami made concessions on

Temple Mount that were not authorised by Barak (Enderlin, 2003, 329-331). Where Ben-

Ami’s pushing of the mandate was successful before the summit, which I spoke of above,

these post-summit incidents had consequences. Sher (2006, 194) recalls that Ben-Ami’s

actions became a concern and that he had to remind him to adhere to the mandate. Israel

Hasson, who was deputy director of the Shin Bet at the time, resigned from the

delegation over his objection to Israeli concessions, specifically criticising Ben-Ami’s

approach (Sher, 2006, 194). Ben-Ami (2022, 151) would later justify his actions, arguing

that “as a minister and leader of a negotiating team, I considered that it was vital that as

the talks proceeded, I should be able to develop a degree of manoeuvrability”.

Balaban (2005, 199) contends that Barak was undermined not only by Arafat but by

figures such as Beilin, Ben-Ami and Lipkin-Shahak as he “could not execute his own

policy”. However, Balaban overlooks the influence these figures had on the advancement

of the negotiations. Barak’s policy was heavily influenced by the security-oriented

negotiating subculture, “peace in strength and security; not peace by giving up security”

(Enderlin, 2003, 112). Whereas his ‘internal opponents’, as Balaban (2005, 133) refers to

them, were much more influenced by the diplomatic-oriented negotiating subculture

(Klieman, 2005, 81, 132). Barak’s proposals, which Balaban (2005, 199) contends were

serious, were influenced by Barak’s more diplomatic-oriented negotiators. Barak’s failure

to implement his original hardline policy enabled him to accept significant concessions,

causing the negotiations to advance to the extent they did. Painting a clear picture of the

effect the negotiators had on Barak, Ben-Ami (2022, 21-22) states that the peace

parameters achieved were only possible due to the negotiators pushing the limits of

Barak’s mandate and Barak's eventual acceptance of many of these positions. The

Clinton Parameters, accepted by Israel in December 2000, reflect many of the internal

deliberations that took place within the Israeli delegation during the process, particularly

on core issues such as Jerusalem. Their acceptance demonstrates that the internal

divisions were not dysfunctional, but rather productive, as they led to the advancement of

negotiations.

Overall, Ehud Barak’s behaviour alienated the Palestinians and was often detrimental to

the peace talks. He struggled to transcend his traditional military persona and failed to

establish trust with Arafat, a prerequisite for progress. Despite this, Barak displayed the

leadership to make concessions on core issues, fundamentally departing from his original

policy. These concessions, which ultimately cost him his premiership, were not made in

isolation. I have argued that the internal divisions within the Israeli negotiating team were

generally productive and aided in progressing the negotiations. Barak’s behaviour and

security-oriented approach were counteracted by the more diplomatic-oriented figures

within his delegation, namely Shlomo Ben-Ami. The discussions during negotiations,

spearheaded by the more dovish negotiators, surrounding core issues such as Jerusalem,

broke long-standing taboos and influenced Barak to make the far-reaching concessions

he did.

Chapter 2: The Palestine Liberation Organization

In this chapter, I will shift my focus to the Palestinian team during the peace talks.

Following the diplomatic historical method informed by international relations outlined in

my methodology, I draw on both primary and secondary sources to identify decisions and

aspects of Palestinian behaviour that contributed to the progress or detriment of the

negotiations. Specifically, I have identified the overall Palestinian rejectionist attitude as

well as the internal Palestinian divisions as the main concerns. I will critically analyse the

Palestinian rejectionism demonstrated throughout the negotiations and look into the

causes behind this before moving on to addressing the internal Palestinian divisions.

Where I previously argued that the internal Israeli divisions contributed to the progression

of the Israeli position and the negotiations, here I contend that the internal Palestinian

divisions had the opposite effect, detrimentally affecting the negotiations.

Rejectionism

When I refer to Palestinian rejectionism, I mean the general Palestinian attitude of

rejecting proposals and refusing to constructively engage by making counteroffers. This

includes the uncompromising Palestinian attitude of entrenchment in hard-line positions

on core issues such as Jerusalem and the right of return for refugees. This rejectionism

extended beyond diplomacy and into narrative, as the Palestinians denied the Jewish

historical connection to the land of Israel. Arafat and other senior Palestinian negotiators

often claimed that the Temple Mount was never in Jerusalem, thus erasing Jewish

connection to Judaism’s most sacred site (Ben-Ami, 2022, 98; Enderlin, 2003, 281;

Pressman, 2003, 19). As Pressman (2003, 19) notes, the “historical inaccuracy of such

claims undermines Palestinian credibility”. For the Israeli negotiators, these statements

from their Palestinian counterparts were not only factually incorrect but deeply alienating

(Sher, 2006, 77). Ginossar (2005, 51) recalls that the inability of the Palestinians to

understand the significance of the Temple Mount to Israel's collective identity was a

“disappointment and loss of trust”.

Reflecting on the rejectionism displayed during negotiations, Danny Yatom (2005, 35)

recalls that where the Israelis proposed ideas and maps, the Palestinians would offer little

in return. He sums up that the majority of reports submitted to Barak by the senior

negotiators amounted to “we made the offer, they asked what else we would be prepared

to give” (Yatom, 2005, 35). The Palestinians often appeared as observers at the summit

rather than participants (Malley, 2005, 112). Miller (2005, 94) criticises the Palestinians for

their “lack of responsiveness, their passivity, and their failure to negotiate in any

meaningful sense of the word”. This led the Israelis to believe that the Palestinians were

not seriously interested in reaching a permanent-status agreement (Meital, 2005, 80). A

range of accounts from senior Israeli negotiators document the many specific instances

of the Palestinian delegation rejecting Israeli proposals without providing counteroffers.

(Ben-Ami, 2022; Lipkin-Shahak, 2005; Sher, 2006).

There are many reasons why the Palestinians possessed a rejectionist attitude during

negotiations. Here, I focus on two reasons. First, their rigid adherence to principle and

reluctance to move away from UN resolutions. Second, their lack of preparation. A third

factor, internal divisions within the Palestinian delegation, will be discussed in the next

sub-chapter.

The Palestinians approached the negotiations from a fundamentally different standpoint

than the Israelis. They believed that their past acceptance of UN Security Council

Resolution 242, coupled with the principle of ‘land for peace’, was their historic

compromise, and that no further concessions would be necessary (Al-Abed, 2005, 74-76;

Dajani, 2005, 56; Indyk, 2009, 311). Resolution 242 calls for the Israeli withdrawal from

territories occupied during the Six-Day War and affirms “respect for and

acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of

every state in the area” as well as “their right to live in peace within secure and

recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force” (UNSC Res 242, 1967). From

this emerged the concept of ‘land for peace’, essentially meaning that Israeli withdrawal

from the occupied territories would be exchanged for recognition and peace from the

surrounding Arab states. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 demonstrated the

implementation of this concept. For many Arab states, this treaty became the “model for

implementing the substance of Resolution 242” (Meital, 2005, 75). Arafat would refer to

this during the summit, stating that he wanted a peace deal “along the lines of the Egypt-

Israel agreement” (Ben-Ami, 2022, 84). He expressed frustration that Egypt regained

everything without making concessions while he was being asked to compromise on core

issues (Ben-Ami, 2022, 84; Hanieh, 2001, 86).

Pressman (2003, 40) argues that the Israelis and the Americans failed to understand “the

minimum Palestinian demands for a final agreement”. However, I argue that it was not a

misunderstanding but a fundamental disagreement. The Israelis viewed the negotiations

with the Palestinians as inherently different from those with their other Arab neighbours

(Yatom, 2005, 39). To the Israelis, the negotiations with the Palestinians were about

“establishing a state that never existed”, which encompassed issues of “refugees, a

capital city and the holy places (Ben-Ami, 2022, 42-43). For them, a permanent-status

agreement would transcend UN resolutions. This fundamental difference over what

should constitute the basis of an agreement was a cause of rejectionism. From the

Palestinian perspective, as they believed they had already made their historic

concessions, no further compromises could be made. Qurie (2008, 267) would explain

that, due to this, they were not able to “respond to the American proposals or to offer

counter-proposals”. For the Palestinians, their rejectionism was internally seen as

standing firm, a principled defence of what they saw as their historic compromise.

However, their adherence to principle would greatly frustrate the Israelis and Americans.

They did not see it as standing firm, but rather demonstrating that they were not

negotiating in good faith. In one notable incident, President Clinton lambasted Qurie,

exclaiming that if he wanted to “give lectures and deliver speeches on Security Council

resolutions”, he could go to the United Nations instead of wasting his time (Ahmed Qurie,

2008, 198). This incident deeply affected Qurie (Qurie, 2008, 198) and, from the Israeli

perspective, he became extremely passive for the remainder of the summit (Ben-Ami,

2022, 67; Sher, 2006, 68).

The second reason behind their rejectionist attitude was a lack of preparation. Qurie

(2008, 153) would admit to the Palestinians' lack of preparation and went further to say

that at times he was even embarrassed by it. The Palestinians would enter negotiations

without clearly defined goals, with the negotiation sessions themselves often being where

the delegation would discuss their positions and agenda (Dajani, 2005, 58). To make this

issue more disadvantageous for the Palestinians, Dajani (2005, 58) states that even the

roles of the Palestinian delegation “were rarely defined with clarity”, leading to negotiators

being involved in discussions they were not qualified to partake in, such as Jerusalem

experts engaging in sessions on security and politicians taking part in legal drafting.

Meital (2005, 74) argues that their lack of preparation was because “they had erroneously

envisioned a summit that, at most, would conclude with general agreements between the

leaders, to be followed up by intensive negotiations in earnest”. Contrary to Meital,

Rashid Khalidi (2006, 162), a Palestinian-American historian of the Middle East, notes that

the unpreparedness of the Palestinians was a problem that had “plagued the Palestinians

in their international negotiations since the very beginning in the 1920s”. Khalidi (2006,

163) explains that this unpreparedness was at its worst during the Oslo Process, which

culminated in the Camp David Process, as Arafat had replaced the previous Palestinian

delegation with a new team of “loyal PLO officials”. Similarly, Dajani (2005, 57) also

observes that Arafat often selected negotiators “based on more overtly political

considerations”. Therefore, while Meital attributes the Palestinians’ inadequate

preparation to misjudgments specific to the summit, a broader perspective suggests that

deeper institutional failures within the Palestine Liberation Organization played a

significant role.

The Palestinians would continue to lack in preparation beyond the summit. Qurie (2008,

260) admits that “on the Palestinian side, we made no systematic collective review of our

negotiating style, nor did we examine the weaknesses and strengths of the Palestinian

performance during the summit”. He further notes that no official record was kept of the

understandings reached with the Israelis (Qurie, 2008, 260-261). This would have a

detrimental effect on the post-summit negotiations as the Palestinians began to

backtrack on understandings reached at the summit, an issue that frustrated the Israelis

(Ben-Ami, 2022, 109; Sher, 2006, 139). Dajani (2005, 60-61) observes that the Palestinians

didn’t begin serious policy work until “after negotiations were in full swing” and that

support teams would feel fully prepared “only by the start of the Taba talks”. Qurie (2008,

324) goes even further, stating that they didn’t sufficiently prepare for the talks at Taba

and went in without a clear vision or negotiating strategy.

The Clinton Parameters

One of the clearest examples of Palestinian rejectionism can be found in their response to

the Clinton Parameters. While much of the focus is placed on the Camp David Summit,

many regard the Clinton Parameters as the missed opportunity of the Camp David

Process (Al Arabiya English, 2020; Ben-Ami, 2022, 2; Bregman, 2015, 265; Ginossar,

2005, 51; Indyk, 2009, 373; Maoz, 2005, 204; Podeh, 2015, 300). The parameters

proposed the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in all of Gaza and

approximately 97% of the West Bank, with Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount

and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall (Enderlin, 2003, 333-339; Pressman, 2003,

8-9; Clinton, 2004, 936-937). Additionally, Palestinian refugees would have multiple

options, including the right of return to the new Palestinian state or compensation from an

international fund, but not the right to return to Israel. Approximately 80% of Israeli

settlers in the West Bank would be concentrated in settlement blocs, and an international

security force would be deployed in the Jordan Valley.

American professor of political science Jeremy Pressman (2003, 9), who has written

extensively on the Arab/Israeli conflict, claims that both sides accepted the Clinton

Parameters. Similarly, Israeli professor of international relations Arie M. Kacowicz (2005,

352), who has also written on the Camp David Process, asserts that the Palestinians “did

not reject the Clinton plan”. While technically true, they both omit the fact that the

Palestinians initially intended to reject the parameters and only accepted them as Israel

had already agreed to accept them (Qurie, 2008, 285). Qurie (2008, 285) admits that the

acceptance was strategic, as they had the intent of modifying all the positions that

weren't acceptable to them.

Crucially, both Pressman and Kacowicz also omit the key detail that the Palestinian

acceptance of the parameters came with reservations on key issues that effectively

annulled the acceptance. For example, the Palestinians outright rejected the proposal on

territory (Qurie, 2008, 286) and continued to stand by their demand for all refugees to

have the right of return to their homes in Israel (Qurie, 2008, 289-291). Both of these

positions directly contradicted the parameters. Podeh (2015, 290) notes that the

Palestinians' documented reservations demonstrate that they “flatly rejected the

parameters under the façade of a favorable response”. This stance was also expressed

by Palestinians internally. A confidential document from the Palestinian Negotiation

Support Unit, leaked by Al Jazeera as part of the Palestine Papers in 2011, unequivocally

states, “We believe that the proposals in general are too vague and unclear to form an

acceptable framework for an agreement” (Negotiation Support Unit, Legal Unit, 2001).

Pressman attempts to justify his argument by stating that while the Palestinians presented

reservations, so did the Israelis. He argues that “if the expression of major qualms was

tantamount to rejection, Israel too rejected this plan” (Pressman, 2003, 20). However, this

equivalence is misleading. Gilead Ini (2016), senior research analyst at CAMERA, would

indirectly label this stance as revisionist due to Pressman’s assertion that, as both sides

presented reservations, they both responded the same way. Podeh (2015, 301) adds that

“any attempt to draw symmetry between the Israeli and Palestinian responses to the

Clinton Parameters is unfounded”. The reservations presented by the Israeli and

Palestinian delegations were essentially dissimilar. As I demonstrated above, the

Palestinian reservations were directly opposed to the parameters, whereas the Israeli

reservations remained within the scope of the parameters, a distinction supported by

senior members of both the Israeli and American delegations as well as Clinton himself.

(Ben-Ami, 2022, 160; Clinton, 2004, 938; Enderlin, 2003, 339; Indyk, 2009, 367; Ross,

2004, 754–755; Sher, 2006, 203).

Internal divisions

In the previous chapter, I argued that internal divisions within the Israeli delegation were

often constructive as they encouraged progress in the negotiations. In contrast, I argue

here that the internal divisions within the Palestinian delegation were not only incessant

but often impeded progress in the negotiations. I will demonstrate how the internal

rivalries and competition, encouraged by Arafat, prevented the Palestinians from forming

a unified negotiating strategy. In doing so, I contribute to a gap in the existing literature

identified during my literature review.

One of the few academics to discuss these internal divisions is Omar Dajani, a

Palestinian-American professor of law who served as a legal advisor to the Palestinian

negotiating team during the Camp David Process. Dajani (2005, 57) explains that during

the Oslo Process, Arafat often selected Palestinian negotiators “based on more overtly

political considerations” and “whether he or she had shown appropriate loyalty in the

past”. Seemingly, this persisted at the Camp David Summit as Dajani (2005, 58) claims

that eleven of the twelve Palestinian delegates were “politicians or political advisors to

Arafat”, contrasted with the more organised Israeli delegation.

Additionally, Qurie (2008, 227) states that “all the members of the Palestinian delegation

were separately attempting to gain access to Abu Ammar, to win him over to their own

views”. According to Dajani (2005, 58), this was due to Arafat's intentional strategy of

encouraging competition between his negotiators while simultaneously often authorising

multiple negotiation tracks with unclear objectives and mandates. Qurie (2008, 327)

elaborates that during the negotiations, each Palestinian negotiator had their own

agenda, often contradicting other members in the delegation, consequently creating a

“self-imposed handicap that made it impossible to make adequate progress at either

venue”. The Israelis were aware of this dynamic, and Sher (2006, 123) notes that from the

Israeli perspective, “the Palestinian negotiating team had no real decision making

authority”.

Qurie (2008, 257-258) admits that Arafat was aware of the detrimental situation but “never

stepped in to resolve it” and exacerbated the hostile internal environment by speaking to

each member separately rather than to the delegation collectively. Dennis Ross (2001)

observed that Arafat's unwillingness to calm the internal hostilities and competition

effectively gave “license to those who were attacking other members who were trying to

find ways to bridge the differences”. Dajani (2005, 52) further highlights that the hostile

competition “discouraged unorthodox thinking and open debate, and resulted in the

communication of mixed messages about Palestinian positions”. This left the Israelis to

decipher the overall Palestinian red lines while questioning the authority of their

Palestinian counterparts (Sher, 2006, 61).

Palestinian negotiators were incredibly competitive with one another, attempting to gain

favour with Arafat, often at the expense of their colleagues (Qurie, 160). Yet, they would

often remain passive with their Israeli counterparts, unwilling to make concessions that

might undermine them politically. Arafat's tendency to remove negotiators last minute

also reinforced an atmosphere of hesitancy, which discouraged constructive thinking.

(Dajani, 2005, 57, 72). From Qurie’s (2008, 210) perspective, the internal conflict was so

bad that it looked as though they had split into different factions that appeared as

“separate delegations in terms of their positions,” while Arafat was “in a realm of his own,

with his own private calculations that had dimensions of which we were unaware”.

The Israelis would identify this split as being between the ‘old guard’ and the ‘new

guard’ (Ben-Ami, 2022, 66, 105; Sher, 2006, 84, 116). The old guard, figures such as

Ahmed Qurie and Mahmoud Abbas, “refused to deviate from orthodoxy to the smallest

extent” (Ben-Ami, 2022, 66), continuously entrenching themselves in uncompromising

positions. The new guard, figures such as Mohammad Rashid, Mohammed Dahlan and

Hasan Asfour, attempted to challenge this ‘all or nothing’ approach (Sher, 2006, 116), but

ultimately were unwilling to directly challenge Arafat (Podeh, 2015, 296). One incident at

the summit saw the tension between these two sides erupt. Abbas and Dahlan nearly

engaged in a physical fight after a verbal altercation (Sher, 2006, 82). Sher (2006, 82)

attributes the confrontation to the new guard’s “constructiveness” clashing with the old

guard’s “shrugging of responsibility and entrenchment in extremist positions”.

A study by Nir Halevy (2008) at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem investigated how

internal conflict within negotiation teams affects the outcome of negotiations. The

research documented “a detrimental effect of subgroup conflict on the performance of

negotiating teams” and found that “teams that had to simultaneously manage internal

and external conflicts performed more poorly than teams that had to manage only

external conflicts” (Halevy, 1697). This is demonstrated within the Palestinian delegation,

as internal conflict greatly hampered the progression of the negotiations and instead

contributed to the static positions and passive behaviour. While this passivity and

uncompromising approach is widely noted in academic literature, as discussed in this

chapter, the internal divisions, which are a significant cause, are rarely touched on. As I

have demonstrated, both senior Palestinian and Israeli figures, as well as academics such

as Dajani, all attest to the significantly damaging effects of the internal divisions.

Concessions

It is worth noting that the Palestinians did ultimately make progress on some of their

positions by the end of the negotiation process. They made concessions in accepting

Israeli annexation of some settlement blocs as well as the annexation of Jewish areas in

East Jerusalem established after 1967 (Pressman, 2003, 22-23). They also accepted the

principle of land swaps and the deployment of international forces in the Jordan Valley

(Pressman, 2003, 23). As noted above, the Palestinian negotiating framework was based

on principles and UN Resolutions, particularly the 1967 borders, and these concessions

marked a significant shift away from this. This was recognised by the Israeli and American

participants. Ben-Ami (2022, 102) labelled the Camp David Summit as a “breakthrough in

Palestinian thinking” as they accepted invasive security measures and agreed to territorial

compromises, unlike any other Arab state. Martin Indyk (2005, 104) similarly pointed out

this shift in Palestinian thinking by recognising the concessions made by Arafat. However,

this progression is generally overshadowed by their broader rejectionist attitude and

rejection of the Clinton Parameters.

As I have demonstrated, rejectionism plagued the Palestinian negotiating strategy and

was a significant factor in the collapse of the Camp David Process. The Palestinian

delegation was often passive and reactive rather than constructive. As Sher (2006, 119)

notes, they failed to “move from dogmatic to pragmatic positions”. Their rejection

stemmed from multiple causes, including a lack of preparation and organisation, which

curtailed their negotiation efforts and hampered their efficiency. Another major cause was

their adherence to principle, basing their negotiating framework around UN Resolutions.

This fundamentally differed from the more flexible Israeli approach, preventing the

Palestinians from offering counterproposals or engaging constructively, particularly as

they believed they had already made their historic compromises. Importantly, internal

Palestinian divisions significantly contributed to the weakening of their negotiating

strategy. The competitiveness within the delegation, which was encouraged rather than

controlled by Arafat, created a hostile environment and confused their Israeli

counterparts. Negotiators vied for Arafat's approval rather than working collectively, and

the split between the ‘old guard’ and the ‘new guard’ further hindered progress.

Ultimately, the hardline positions of the old guard prevailed over the new guard's more

constructive and compromising approach. While it is important to recognise the

significant concessions made by the Palestinians in contradiction to their adherence to

principle, they are overshadowed by their broader rejectionist attitude and internal

divisions, which contributed significantly to the failure of the talks.

Conclusion

The objective of my research was to assess the extent to which Palestinian rejectionism

caused the failure of the Camp David Process, focusing on the human factor. I conclude

that Palestinian rejectionism caused the failure of the Camp David Process to a

considerable extent. It was demonstrated not only through rejecting proposals and

refusing to make counteroffers but also through the rejection of Jewish history, including

rejection of the Jewish connection to the Temple Mount and the Israeli national narrative.

The main causes of this rejectionism were strict adherence to principle, lack of

preparation and internal disputes. Strict adherence to principle prevented flexibility of

positions and largely precluded counter-offers, rendering the Palestinians passive and

seemingly disinterested in the process. Lack of preparation and organisation rendered

them inefficient during negotiations, and their failure to document and review

understandings reached reinforced their appearance as passive participants.

Internal disputes were another major cause of Palestinian rejectionism. In addressing this,

my research has contributed to filling a gap in the knowledge which I identified during my

literature review. My research has shown that intense competition within the Palestinian

delegation, which was encouraged rather than quelled by Arafat, “discouraged

unorthodox thinking and open debate” (Dajani, 52). With no unified position, negotiators

held individual positions but were reluctant to advance ideas, fearing removal by Arafat or

reproach from colleagues for making concessions. The Palestinian delegation effectively

split into the ‘old guard’ and the ‘new guard’, with Arafat being separate from both of

these inner factions. Entrenched in dogmatic and hardline positions, the old guard

silenced the more pragmatic new guard, who were unwilling to challenge Arafat. As I have

demonstrated, these internal divisions negatively affected the outcome of the peace talks.

More broadly, my research also suggests that internal divisions negatively affect the

outcome of negotiation processes in general.

My research has also found that Israel contributed to the failure of the Camp David

Process, though to a more limited extent. Barak’s interpersonal conduct was perceived by

the Palestinians as arrogant, unempathetic and dictatorial and negatively affected the

negotiations. However, filling a gap in the knowledge on the internal divisions within the

Israeli delegation, my research found that Barak’s negotiators successfully challenged him

to advance the negotiations. Shlomo Ben-Ami, in particular, pushed Barak beyond his

initial hardline policies. I also demonstrated how the diplomatic and security-oriented

Israeli negotiating subcultures, which Klieman (2005) previously discussed, interacted

during the negotiations. The Israelis made significant progress by breaking taboos, such

as discussing concessions on Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, demonstrating a

willingness to think pragmatically and dramatically renege on initial positions.

My research also highlighted other factors that contributed to the failure of the Camp

David Process that I was unable to address due to a limited word count. One significant

factor was the role of the Americans as mediators. The Americans failed to govern the

summit effectively or efficiently, which led to disorganisation and no clear agenda

(Ginossar, 2005, 56; Maoz, 2005, 207; Sher, 2006, 115; The Human Factor, 2021).

Additionally, the Palestinians were suspicious of the ‘special relationship’ between Israel

and the Americans and feared a deal would be imposed on them (Indyk, 2005, p. 102).

Other contributing factors were Barak’s decision to prioritise negotiations with Syria,

coupled with his withdrawal from Lebanon, which alienated the Palestinians. They felt

sidelined by Barak’s decision to negotiate first with Syria, while also believing that Barak’s

decisions to withdraw from Lebanon demonstrated that violence rather than diplomacy

yielded results. The continuation of settlement expansion and terrorism also contributed

to the failure of the process, but were excluded from my dissertation due to a limited word

count.

My findings highlight the importance of the human factor in Israeli/Palestinian

negotiations. Significantly, my findings are still relevant as the Israeli/Palestinian conflict

persists currently, and negotiations are likely to resume in the future. Therefore, my

research can present recommendations for future negotiations. For the Israelis, building

trust with the Palestinians is crucial. Future Israeli governments should engage in trust-

building measures and focus solely on negotiations with the Palestinians, as opposed to

simultaneous negotiations with neighbouring Arab countries. Internal Israeli deliberations

on core issues at the heart of the Israeli narrative, such as Jerusalem, need to be

sufficiently discussed before future negotiations. Similarly, public preparation for potential

concessions is necessary. Lastly, a unified Israeli negotiating position, as opposed to

straddling between the security and diplomatic-oriented negotiating subcultures, would

strengthen future efforts. Admittedly, achieving this is difficult due to the effects of

terrorism and war on the Israeli conscience, especially after the attacks of October 7,

2023.

For the Palestinians, recognising the Jewish historical connection to Jerusalem and the

Temple Mount avoids building any mistrust with the Israelis. Importantly, the Palestinians

would benefit greatly from sufficiently preparing for any future negotiations and

continuously documenting and evaluating the progress and understandings reached.

Similarly, the Palestinians would benefit from a unified delegation in future negotiations.

Rather than a culture of competition and fear, my findings recommend the

encouragement of unorthodox and pragmatic thinking, free from political consequences.

While my methodology was robust, allowing me to utilise a wealth of credible diplomatic

primary sources, I have identified limitations. Firstly, the limitation of language. I was only

able to access sources in English, which excluded sources in Arabic and Hebrew that

could have potentially contributed to my research. Secondly, there is an asymmetry of

sources. Israeli and American perspectives are much more accessible and detailed

compared to the underrepresented Palestinian perspectives. As my research is focused

on the human factor, this asymmetry meant I was unable to address Israeli and

Palestinian perspectives with equal depth. Lastly, I lacked access to internal notes and

diplomatic records. Consequently, my research relies heavily on the retrospective

accounts published by participants, which carry risks of omission and bias.

Although the Camp David Process occurred over two decades ago, the conclusions

drawn from my research are still important in the present day, as the Israeli/Palestinian

conflict is still ongoing. The failure of the Camp David Process had drastic consequences.

If we look at the human factor, since September 2000, when the second intifada erupted,

over 10,000 Israelis and Palestinians have been killed as a result of the conflict (B’Tselem).

Strikingly, this figure does not include the thousands killed since war broke out on

October 7, 2023 (BBC, 2025). The failure of negotiations has disastrous consequences.

Therefore, research on previous negotiations, such as this work on the Camp David

Process, is of vital importance.

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