Trump’s Gaza Gamble: A Vague Roadmap, But the Only Road Ahead

On Monday, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu standing beside him, President Donald Trump announced his plan to end the Gaza war, return the hostages, and begin rebuilding. The 20-point framework agreement is void of any technical details, relying instead on broad principles and goals.

The plan envisions ending the war, releasing the hostages, and gradually withdrawing the IDF. It also calls for the release of 250 Palestinian prisoners serving life sentences, along with 1,700 Gazans detained after October 7, 2023. Crucially, it stipulates the disarmament of Hamas, the demilitarisation of Gaza, and the commitment of Hamas and other factions to abstain from any role in Gaza’s future governance.

An International Stabilization Force, made up of Arab and international partners, would be deployed into the Strip and gradually replace the IDF as Israeli forces withdraw. The plan describes this force as “the long-term internal security solution,” tasked with training and supporting Palestinian police forces in Gaza under consultation with Jordan and Egypt, both of which have already begun training thousands of Palestinian police officers. Governance would be transferred to a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, supervised by a “Board of Peace” chaired by Trump himself, with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair also playing a role, an unpopular figure in much of the Middle East. This system is intended to be temporary until the Palestinian Authority can assume responsibility after completing its reform program. However, past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have shown the risks of such 'temporary systems'. The Palestinian Authority itself was originally intended to be a temporary administration during the Oslo Process.

Crucially for Israel, the hostages take priority. The plan makes full IDF withdrawal and the release of Palestinian prisoners contingent on the hostages’ return, removing Hamas’ key leverage. In substance, it meets Israel’s war aims: dismantling Hamas and freeing the hostages. With Netanyahu also securing last-minute amendments that slowed IDF withdrawal and strengthened the language on Hamas’ disarmament, he had little choice but to agree.

However, for Netanyahu’s key coalition partners, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, the plan dashes their personal war aims. Both ministers have been vocal about rebuilding settlements in Gaza, yet point 16 of the plan explicitly states that “Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza,” preventing any settlements from being rebuilt. They are likely to be further infuriated by point 12, which, while allowing Gazans the option to leave, stresses that they should be encouraged to remain and promises that no one will be forced out. This directly contradicts the agenda of far-right figures like Ben-Gvir, who have openly promoted Palestinian emigration from Gaza.

For Netanyahu, then, the plan is not only a diplomatic gamble but also a political one. If he fully commits to it, without undermining it behind the scenes, he risks losing his coalition. Smotrich and Ben-Gvir could bolt, potentially collapsing the government. Yet with recent polls showing Netanyahu vulnerable to defeat in next year’s election, he could gamble that bringing home the hostages and soldiers will earn him credit with voters when elections are called. 

Importantly, this time all sides are on board. Unlike the recent Saudi-French proposal, which lacked either Israeli or U.S. support, Trump’s plan has the backing of every key player. Qatar and Turkey, long sympathetic to Hamas, have welcomed it, as have Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. With Israel, Arab states, and the EU aligned, the pressure shifts onto Hamas while Israel enjoys, at least briefly, relief from increasing diplomatic isolation. Netanyahu may prioritise potential normalisation deals with Arab and Muslim countries in the future over the self-destructive ambitions of his far-right partners, especially with Trump eager to expand the Abraham Accords. This plan could be the pathway to those deals.

Qatar, which hosts Hamas’s political leadership, has been a central mediator throughout the conflict. It too has welcomed the plan. Israeli journalist Amit Segal argues that Israel’s failed strike on Hamas leaders in Doha signalled to Qatar that it can no longer support Hamas without consequence, a shift that may now push Doha to pressure Hamas into accepting the deal. Yet before the press conference, Netanyahu met with Trump and, during that meeting, spoke with the Qatari Prime Minister to apologise for the strike, assuring that Israel would not target Qatari territory again. Significantly, Trump also signed an executive order committing to defend Qatar if it is attacked again. This marks a shift in U.S. foreign policy to now consider any military action against Qatar as “a threat to the peace and security of the United States.” According to Haviv Rettig Gur, senior analyst at The Times of Israel, this then leaves Qatar as the only safe haven for Hamas, with Trump also giving Israel his blessing to “finish the job” in Gaza should Hamas reject the plan. Point six stipulates that “members of Hamas who wish to leave Gaza will be provided safe passage to receiving countries.” Qatar could well be one of these countries if it decides to continue to accommodate Hamas, given its promise of protection by Trump. Haviv further suggests Qatar may now have leverage if it fully backs the deal, as Al Jazeera, Qatar’s state-backed network with immense influence in the region, could potentially soften its defence of Hamas and present the plan to Gazans as their path to a better future.

Many have criticised the plan for falling short of establishing Palestinian statehood. Trump’s plan, however, should not be seen as an attempt to secure a two-state solution. While it satisfies Israel’s demand that the Palestinian Authority remain sidelined from post-war Gaza governance, it leaves open the possibility that, following PA reforms, “conditions may be in place” for “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.” These vaguely worded clauses will frustrate Netanyahu and his far-right allies, but they should be read less as substantive commitments than as concessions designed to secure Arab and Muslim acceptance of the plan. Trump’s focus lies in ending the war, returning the hostages, and rebuilding Gaza, not in state-building.

Still, the plan is only a framework agreement, and it is riddled with equivocal language familiar from decades of Middle East diplomacy. Point 16, for example, states that “as the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States, with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens.” But what defines a “secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat”? Significantly, these “standards, milestones and timeframes” are not yet agreed upon. Similarly, Point 15 calls for the ISF to “train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza.” How many? Will they be armed? If so, to what extent? During the Oslo period, Palestinian police exceeded their arms allowances, and these weapons were later turned against Israelis during the Second Intifada. The plan, then, is best understood as a roadmap. It is aspirational, fragile, and still undefined. Its success depends on details yet to be negotiated, and it could just as easily unravel under the very ambiguities that have long haunted peace efforts in the region.

Despite these uncertainties, the plan is necessary. If it can be negotiated down to the fine details, it could bring Palestinians an end to a brutal war that has stretched nearly two years and claimed countless lives. It could also begin to offer them a better future, one free of Hamas and of war. For Israel, it promises the return of the hostages and soldiers, helping to heal a wound that has deeply scarred its society. The plan has momentum, but in the Middle East, momentum can collapse as quickly as it is built. This plan begins to present a ‘day after’, something Netanyahu has until now refused to put forward. Whether this framework becomes a turning point or another missed opportunity will depend entirely on the details, negotiations staying on track and, crucially, if Hamas accepts it.